

“A Rational Foreign Policy for an Almost Middle Power”

John W. Holmes Memorial Lecture

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I am more than a little overwhelmed by the invitation to deliver the 2016 John W. Holmes Lecture. John W. Holmes was one of those Canadian foreign policy experts and professional External Affairs Officers who was there at the beginning of both mid-war and post war Canadian foreign policy. His service during the war, afterwards as our Chargé in Moscow, then as permanent delegate to the UN and then Assistant Under-Secretary at the department, all between the crucial years of 1944 and 1960, speaks with elegance and depth to his role in the construction of the post-war institutions, values and purposes that have defined, and continue to define Canada's standing and goals: diplomatic, military, alliance, development and peace-keeping as a participant in world affairs to this day. As he was also a victim of the oppression and discriminatory investigation of homosexuals by the-then RCMP it reminds us all that we take today's openness and inclusiveness on so many issues for granted at our peril. His work outside of government, as President of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, as a Professor of International Relations at this University, and at this college, and at the Universities of Toronto and Leeds points extensively, along with his writings and books on the building of a new world order and the Canadian-American relationship, to not only his immense experience as a distinguished practitioner, but as a source of analytical coherence and fresh ideas

on foreign policy. While his election to the Royal Society of Canada, his ten honorary degrees, his JB Tyrell Historical Medal for his writings and his elevation to the rank of Officer in the Order of Canada, tells us that he did not lack for recognition and well-deserved kudos, I am one of those who has always felt that the full dimension of his work, loyalty, diligence, leadership and service still remains to be properly recognized for the depth of contribution and inspiration it represented. My old friend, and former colleague at Queen's, Kim Nossal, in his writings on John W. Holmes' approach to foreign policy, advanced the premise, with which I agree, that John Holmes was very much an adherent to, and proponent of, "the English school" of international relations theory. That school holds that, despite the risks of anarchy and its examples both between and within states, it is ideas rather than simple competitive capacities and capabilities that shape the conduct of international relations and politics. The analysis and understanding of those ideas matters to the conduct of foreign policy and is fundamental to understanding the dynamics of bilateral international relations or even multi-lateral global interaction and engagement.

In reflecting with you this evening on how we might conceive of and elaborate a rational foreign policy for an almost-middle-power,

my purpose is to propose a particular nexus of understanding of exogenous pressures, underlying concepts of society and world order, competing issues of capacity and reach with which to build a rational foreign policy. My proposal is about the right mix of aspiration, values, realpolitik and pragmatic goals and instruments.

In terms of underlying assumptions and definitions I do not for one moment assume or suggest that all rationality is missing from our existing foreign policy. Nor do I in any way, seek to be pejorative in using the term, “almost-middle-power”. There are many ways to categorize or frame what a middle power is.

But as I am here to share the best of my own thinking on the issue, for better or worse, I must tell you that a middle power that does not spend at least .7 of one percent of its GDP on international development, or at least 2 percent of its GDP on deployable military capacity, however positive its intentions, however its positive intentions may be explained, however it may do some of what international responsibility suggests is required, is not quite a “middle power”.

We were clearly a “middle power” and then some near the end of World War II and in the institution-building decades that followed,

when John Holmes served our country. But as we sit here this evening, neither our international development budget, nor our deployable strategic capacity on land, on and under the sea, in the air, in special operations or intelligence is sufficient for a country with thirty-six million residents and the second largest land mass in the world – not to mention our three long and challenging coast lines. Nor are we truly able to do all that we should to contribute to the freedom of the seas, so fundamental to the trade routes that are vital to our imports and exports, our economy, employment and our central mix of productivity and social justice as a rational and modern democracy. That we do some of what is necessary is not bad. But it is also not sufficient. Inability to project our values and defend Canadians abroad, deploy effectively and in meaningful middle-power force for humanitarian, combat, alliance support, peace-building, diplomatic and development initiatives means that the middle-power status we once enjoyed is not now ours, but it is within reach.

That middle-power status is not of course, an end or even a purpose in and of itself. But being a robust middle-power gives us a perch, a vantage point, a respected platform on which what we care about as Canadians can be defended, advanced and shared. Those values may encompass a strong stand on global warming,

the preference for diplomatic solutions over war, a more humane and more robust gathering-in of the migrants who fuel the refugee issue worldwide; a global multi-cultural and multi-racial vision that embraces diversity and eschews narrow and pettifogging nationalist and nativist excess; a support for human rights, rule of law, judicial independence, gender equality and free and open elections; a balance between freer trade and genuine protection against poverty and dislocation that can sometimes be an unwitting result of some trade patterns and imbalances. Advancing these, being there for allies and partners with disasters created by neighbouring aggression, natural disasters or internal strife requires a resolute, creative and enduring platform. That platform must be objectively stable, robust, multi-capable, solid and resilient. And we must not be the only people who think so if our thought process is not to be delusional.

Being an effective middle-power is about robust and deployable diplomatic, strategic and development resources. But it is also about purposes.

For the purposes to be effectively pursued they need to be understood, both at home and abroad. And for that to happen, they need to be articulated by government, discussed broadly within the

population, afforded a measure of priority and sustainability and last longer than the last or next minister and ideally, longer than the last or present government.

New governments have every right to seek a mandate for recalibration of our foreign policy priorities; to offer, when in opposition, coherent critiques of the incumbent government's ersatz priorities, or the methods, ham handed or otherwise, selected to advance those priorities. I am not one of those who believe that foreign policy should be some sort of immutable catechism beyond the reach of legitimate democratic or media debate or scrutiny. But since world leaders do not wake up every morning asking themselves, their wives or husbands, friends or mistresses about Canada as a first order of business, not even and especially our direct neighbours to the south, a measure of the effectiveness and sustainability of a coherent foreign policy has something to do with continuity and sustainability not with every nuance, regional variation, or tactic, but certainly with the underlying themes and framing principles.

In saying this, I very much understand that many foreign service professionals argue against that kind of focused clarity and clearly-stated purpose so that they can have maximum freedom to deal

with events, expected or otherwise, that always come up and are less than frequently well-anticipated. That may be, in some measure, not without salience, but as a way for an almost-middle-power to manage enhanced impact and effectiveness on a global basis, it is simply a recipe for “muddling through”. Now I recognize that “muddling through” in face of economic dislocations, terrorist eruptions, climate change-driven natural disasters, rogue nations and the ever more dystopian bleeps, burps, tweets and multi-platform social media outbursts that seem to radiate against any measure of stability or continuity can well be embraced as a victory and not inestimable of sorts . None of us should confuse muddling through with making an impact, especially one of substance or lasting value. I am respectful of public servants and Foreign Service Officers who would be less than animated by my aspiration for a foreign policy of substance and impact. But I simply disagree with that kind of “muddling through” defeatism or worse, cynicism. The old time practitioners always prefer realism over idealism, as if the two were inimical one to the other.

At some level, wanting an idealistic foreign policy connects with one’s belief that foreign policy actually matters and, if done right, can make a serious difference in the human condition of millions

world wide – a bias to which I freely and openly admit. Idealism without realism is more prayer than policy. Cynical realism without underlying ideals is purpose free policy.

Ideas matter and the way in which Canada's ideas are advanced and shared should have some measurable effect on processes and outcomes that shape something more than a muddle-through world.

One need not be tied to a Manichean world view, of good guys and bad guys, forces of light and forces of darkness, or be contemptuous of those who take a different view of global or human priorities to want a foreign policy that is driven by our priorities and our values. Not because they are always better, either in origin or purport, but simply because, quite frankly, they are ours.

A rational foreign policy must reflect a rational consensus at home of what Canadians value in their day-to-day lives: safety from the forces of fear, embracing the core freedoms, from want and from fear, that define our ability, however imperfectly, to manage our own affairs as a reasonably stable, if at times reasonably contentious, but open democracy.

This is not about Canadian values being perfect. It is about the tools by which we shape our values, change them and improve them, discuss and debate them in a reasonably civil and humane fashion. We know how that is done when it is done well, which is to be fair, not all the time by any means. But whether it is the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Diefenbaker Bill of Rights, the advent of universal health insurance, the provision of free primary and secondary education, safe and reasonably violence-free societies and communities, free collective bargaining, managing steady inflows of hundreds of thousands of refugees and immigrants over the years, the context within which good things have happened to the benefit of millions of Canadians and the vast majority of our people actually matters. It is the same context that sees unpopular governments defeated, new governments chosen, a free and open media and realizations over time that, as a society, we have made horrific mistakes – mistakes like the mistreatment and marginalization of our First Nations, less than stellar engagement on the environment, bigotry for many decades on LGBT rights and continued insensitivity on issues of poverty, practical racism and how we treat the most aged, frail and vulnerable among us.

A viable and humane society need not be perfect or aspire to perfection. But we do need a context within which we can be both aspirational about doing better and frank about where we have failed and have the freedom to be open and honest about both.

I have said elsewhere, and continue to believe, that the defining underpinnings of that kind of open and constructive context are the two freedoms that matter the most: freedom from fear and freedom from want.

These freedoms date back to the Atlantic joint declaration built by Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt 75+ years ago when the two met at Placentia Bay in August of 1941.

Mr. Churchill, the British people and the Dominions of the-then Empire, Canada very much included, along with India, Australia, New Zealand, our Caribbean brothers and sisters, and even some in Africa were all that stood between Mr. Hitler, his axis allies in Italy and Japan and the end of civilization as it was then appreciated. Our American neighbours, through lend lease and many other manipulations while helping all they could, were not yet full-throated military allies in the conduct of that war. Japan had yet to attack at Pearl Harbor. British cities had been under a fierce barrage of massive civilian-targeted bombing by the

Luftwaffe for almost a year. The Germans had violated the Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression Pact and begun, with their Operation Barbarossa, to attack the-then Soviet Union with huge force allocations. From Canadian ports like St Johns and Halifax, long convoys of supplies, fuel, food, armaments, soldiers, medical supplies, all in merchant ships escorted at immense risk by the Royal Canadian Navy, sought to provision the outpost of democracy and civilization the United Kingdom had become. America had not yet shaped the internal political consensus necessary to join the effort formally.

It was in that context that the key elements of the Atlantic Charter were negotiated between Churchill and Roosevelt. It was not about a common 'crie de guerre'. It was instead a 'crie de coeur' about what the world should be like when hostilities might come to an end. Critical principles like the peaceful solution of international disputes, the freer movement of trade, the ability of millions to live free from fear and want, the right of countries to self-determination were embraced and proclaimed.

That these principles should form the foundation of post-war organizations like the United Nations, like NATO, or the de-colonization of the British Empire in favour of a Commonwealth

of independent and hopefully, but not always, democratic nations speaks eloquently of the world that people like John W. Holmes tried to build with the support of leaders like Mr. Saint Laurent of Canada, Mr. Truman of the United States, and Mr. Atlee of the United Kingdom.

Those values were not unrelated to the deployment by the west of the Marshall Plan in post-war Europe to stop totalitarian communism in its tracks before all of impoverished post-war Europe fell under the control of the Red Army and its civilian allies in many western countries. Economic rebuilding and financial liquidity were seen as essential, along with the commitments to mutual defence of the NATO partners with large deployments in Western Europe, including five thousand Canadians, to preserve a measure of democracy, open markets and self-determination. The building of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the development agencies of the UN all followed institutional efforts to shore up and make deeper the two basic freedoms for which the war had been fought and the Nazis defeated.

These two freedoms were at the inflection point for a new world and also a Cold War that would last for decades. What had been

learned because of the mistakes that led to the Second World War was clear. Economic and strategic strength must go hand in hand if totalitarian threats from the left or the right are to be contained. If one of the two basic freedoms is weakened or lost, the pressures on the remaining one become unsustainable.

Hence Lester Pearson could be both a competent Cold warrior and a peace-certifying foreign minister. Diefenbaker could be against nuclear weapons for Canada, but for confronting the bigotry and enslavement of apartheid. The lesson of Czechoslovakia in 1938 was also clear – aggression un-resisted becomes aggression expanded and made more horrific and brutal. Mutual defence is not the same as aggression and may be the only viable response to aggression or its threat.

So, part of building a rational foreign policy today that is reflective of our history and prophylactic for a safer world is the embrace of these two core freedoms as underlying priorities which supersede all others and against which the effectiveness of our foreign policy should be judged by our own people and the world.

Nothing is less emblematic of a foreign policy of substance and effect than a slate of micro-priorities brought in by successive

ministers and governments, changed frequently, overlaid with new ones, and all massively underfunded. This has been the Canadian practice for the last post-Pearson decades.

Coherent priorities at the base of our foreign policy would not dilute or diminish the importance of nuance or local judgment by professional Canadian Foreign Service and diplomatic officials.

How these freedoms are advanced, promoted or made real through deploying Canadian resources, diplomatic, investment, humanitarian, peacebuilding, intelligence or combat would differ country by country and circumstance by circumstance. But what we are doing and why we are doing it would be clear for all to see and understand.

Debates about how best to do it would be a huge part of our domestic, political, academic and media narrative, which is as it should be. We know that the context for improvement in these freedoms in Saudi Arabia, Chile, Israel, and the Caribbean would be very different, as would the appropriate implementation tactics and skills

It would involve some re-organization of Global Affairs Canada where the core ideas of our foreign policy purpose had parity with the regional organizations and desk officer structures that determine how we operate now.

If these freedoms are to be our core purpose globally as a country because we believe that the broadening of these two freedoms would advance the human condition, promote stability and opportunity for millions and security and opportunity for Canada, we also need to understand who the opponents are of these freedoms.

The biggest threat we face is the global onslaught against the very liberal democratic order that was built by men like Holmes and Pearson and their counterparts among our allies and partners worldwide after the war, is the counter argument to liberal democracy being advanced in many parts of the world by proponents of an authoritarian view of governance; that sees democracy as weak, and seeks to prove it as such wherever possible.

A rational Canadian foreign policy built around these two freedoms, from want and from fear, must have a real and engaged

focus in every relevant region of the world, relevant to Canadian interests. In regions that are part of our neighborhood, it means re-engaging with the Caribbean, especially the Commonwealth Caribbean, in a much more coherent and sustained way. Many of these countries in which Canada and Canadians have significant interests and which have large diasporas here at home, are in economic trouble under IMF stewardship or very close, are being intimidated in some measure by Venezuela and are deeply deserving of our time and investment. “Brexit” will unnecessarily complicate this region’s trade relations with the UK which, as we speak, run through Brussels. A significant re-negotiation of trade agreements with London will require immense capacity and due diligence, areas where Canada should be supportive. Trade and tourism and fiscal capacity is vital to freedom from want in this region, as is having robust corresponding banking arrangements with the rest of the world. The withdrawal of Canadian banks from the region would be a serious strategic and tactical blunder, yet there is a disturbing trend in that direction. More constrained economic networks and opportunity will reduce job creation and investment potential, producing higher levels of poverty and more opportunity for criminal and terrorist interests. This is directly salient to the safety and opportunity of Canadians at home. Yet, Canada has just about deserted this Caribbean field of engagement

at precisely the time that Canadian presence, development investment, and security cooperation could mean so much. Canada represents the Caribbean in the councils of the World Bank and IMF. We have immigration flows and temporary worker programmes that embrace many Caribbean residents, yet our presence on the ground in support of the two freedoms is paltry. In the Caribbean, the enemy of progress on the two freedoms is our own disengagement and apathy. Influence comes from engagement. Disengagement reduces influence and the salience in a deserted region of the Canadian ideal. The ideals of freedom, opportunity, openness, diversity, rule of law, stability and fairness are huge global assets for this country. Abdication in its promotion by disengaging is simply wrong, short-sighted, and penny wise and pound foolish.

We must also be frank and direct in shaping a foreign policy where performance and progress against our core goals is real and measured. Questions a studious Minister or Deputy or Cabinet Secretary for Defence and Foreign Policy might ask regularly of both the Pearson and Diefenbaker buildings on Sussex would include:

- What have we done to increase job opportunities in Gaza and the West Bank?

- What progress have we made in sub-Saharan Africa in the distribution of development investment?
- How has our MOU with the effective and engaged Agha Khan Development Foundation operated in those parts of the world that have been targeted for joint engagement and investment?
- What is our plan to invest in the Caribbean to ensure rising economic prospects, job opportunities, and the more thorough embrace of middle income status?
- How are we doing in support of human rights in places like Saudi Arabia, China and minority rights elsewhere?
- What progress have we made in addressing the re-criminalization of homosexuality in Commonwealth African countries?

These are the sorts of questions a genuine foreign policy would evoke, if it was based on the two freedoms. The Minister should have the answers to these questions on a regular basis. He should report to Canadians on these sorts of measures on a regular basis.

A coherent foreign policy shaped around these two key freedoms, from want and from fear, requires regional and country specific strategies to be pursued, calibrated and measured in a coherent and

direct way. These two key freedoms should shape the threat spectrum by which we allocate priority and resources. For example, in the Middle East, Israel and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are very different societies. The first is an open democracy with press freedom, gender equality and independent judiciary, regular and highly contentious elections. Israel is far from perfect but it is also a place where there is a strong culture of dissent and debate. Saudi Arabia has none of these democratic attributes. But in support of freedom from fear in the region, the framework of a resolute balance of power is vital. Israel and Saudi Arabia, while very different from each other, are an absolute bulwark and balance of power in the region between those countries that are open to the west and those who dine out on hostility to the west, between Shia and Sunni. A balance of power is vital and Canada should not have a foreign policy that discounts its importance in any region of the world.

All this brings us to the challenge of a revanchist Russia that, under present leadership, seems bent on rebuilding regional and global influence, intimidation, and robust strategic leverage. This is as true in Eastern Europe and the Middle East as it is in the Arctic; three regions in the world where Canadian interests are strategic and compelling.

Here, perspective and history actually matter. In terms of efficacy, consolidated power, a coherent message, and a more sustained Potemkin Village democracy, Putin must be given credit for a measure of success. He may not be very democratic by our standards but it is not our standards that count. By historical Russian authoritarian standards, his are reasonably democratic within the historical context of an authoritarian state driven, KGB Secret Police framework of which President Putin and many of his colleagues in the Russian government are or have been integral parts. At first his ability to consolidate after Yeltzin was motivated by a broad Russian popular desire for stability and an end to the sense of fragmentation and collapse. High energy prices, paying state salaries and pensions and a working coalition with wealthy Oligarchs and an intense - if brutal - response to terrorism all fueled understandable popularity and political authority.

There is a direct line between decline in energy prices for the Russian treasury and increased external adventurism in Crimea, in Syria, and in military deployments abroad. The increased military presence in the Arctic - and increased Russian deployment of aircraft, ships, submarines and land forces to test air and sea defences of NATO allies - strengthen aggressive strategic

capacities in Kaliningrad, deploy excessive force against civilians in defence of Syria's Assad junta, and generally pursue policies aimed at weakening Europe and the EU all reflect internal economic and political difficulties. As do threatening and taunting NATO and re-establishing a "beachhead for totalitarianism" in the Middle East. This, plus the "Tokyo Rose" and "Lord HAHA" tactics of RT television worldwide, not to mention what various US National security agencies have identified as cyber hacking and direct Russian intervention in the US election, speak to a new and Russian tactical threat. I say tactical as opposed to strategic because it is important, in shaping our foreign policy, that we make a distinction between the two.

Russia does not possess the military depth, high tech acuity, agility and force diversity necessary to strategically challenge the United States and our NATO allies, along with regional stabilizers such as Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Israel and others in a multi-theatre engagement. The comparative relationship that existed when General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan met in Hofstra House in Reykjavik in October of 1986 has not altered meaningfully. The Soviets then and the Russians now may possess more direct military punch than their closest Eastern European neighbours, which is why harassment of those neighbours is so

attractive to the Russians now. The strategic gap between Russia and the NATO powers plus, remains reasonably broad, above and beneath the seas, in the air, on the land, in Special Forces, and in surveillance, drone and cyber technology. The difference is, and this is important, that for local small nation harassment and EU destabilization, the Russians are able and quite willing to deploy, as they have against Georgia, Eastern Ukraine, and in horrific bombing runs targeting civilians in Syria. Having greater capacity to deploy but less will to deploy may be a sign of western restraint and the appropriate prudence and caution of western democracies that seek always to avoid war. Knowing that one's competitor, as is the case with our Russian friends, have no such compunction and no real leavening of short-term tactical opportunities by domestic public opinion must be part of our tactical calculus.

The fact that the Russians are now moving ahead with an intermediate range nuclear missile programme in clear violation of the agreement signed in 1987 on reduction by both sides of intermediate range weapons, cannot be ignored. That Russian and Egyptian forces are planning joint military exercises, points to Russia's aspirational footprint in the Middle East and the north of Africa. Joint missile defence initiatives by the computer command staff of both China and Russia, speaks to their respective desire to

close the technological gap with the Americans on this important file. Analysts at Stratfor have spoken to the harsh reality of prospective Russian militarization of the Arctic in terms of clashing sovereignties and territorial claims and interest in the vast underwater resources. All these tactical initiatives do not add up to a serious strategic threat. But they do add up to the kind of tactical efforts to de-stabilize and intimidate in support of Mr. Putin's internal political and economic challenges and the classic need to create an external enemy where none actually exists.

What is strategic and important to counter and circumnavigate, is the promotion of a new Eurasian Culture by President Putin; a promotion that expressly rejects the core premises of liberal democratic order built after the war and strengthened at the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Eurasian Union and underlying culture is about an orthodox approach to society; a rejection of the "weaknesses" of western liberal democracy and a clear disavowal of areas of cultural tolerance and embrace of diversity around minorities, LGBT rights, and media freedom and dissent. This is about a new order, one that rejects the embrace by proximate states geographically, of more western social and economic values, however legitimized by open elections and referenda. It is about sustaining the sinews of a Eurasian Russia-

driven culture, or China-driven in Asia, that embraces authoritarian central control as the only guarantor of social and economic stability. Tactical military engagement, as we have seen in Crimea and Syria, and may be deployed elsewhere, would be part and parcel of the Russian strategy on this file. As is intervention of various kinds to encourage Brexit, support the Front National in France and assist Mr. Trump in the United States. Defacto cooperation with Iran, disengagement from the North Korea file, attempted closeness with China, talk of new bases in Cuba and Vietnam are all about creating a sense of genuine momentum for the anti-liberal democratic agenda. To that extent, continued Russian bombing runs, naval cruise missile attacks in the Middle East, increased flow of refugees towards Europe, and Russia's tactical goal of putting pressure on the EU, NATO members, and the Atlantic relationship is well advanced. Mr. Putin deserves credit for the mix of audacity, pugnacious tactics, and verbal clarity he and his colleagues and state instruments have and are deploying. Credit is one thing; compliance or submission is quite another.

Our foreign policy towards Russia should be nuanced in areas of diplomatic and cultural engagement but absolutely clear around the defence of the two freedoms, from fear and from want, as they are

threatened by Russia abroad and in some measure ignored at home. That the CBC shut down its Radio Canada International Russian and Ukrainian language broadcasts some years ago shows how we reduce our non-military ways of engagement in manners that are pound foolish and penny wise. The present government of Canada's desire to re-engage with Russia and Iran is not, in and of itself, wrong. Lacking a coherent strategy for doing so across a wide range of conditionalized and important issues would be wrong. Deploying half a battle group to Eastern Europe as part of a NATO deployment so as to preserve capacity for an amorphous peace-making, or building, or keeping, or aspiring mission in Africa points to the lack of linkage between tactical reality on the ground and the strategic imperative to defend the two freedoms for ourselves and our democratic Eastern European NATO partners. If the Canadian government is not now planning, with appropriate outside advisors, a sustained citizen-to-citizen communication with Russians about the opportunities, strengths, and weaknesses of the liberal democratic option, in terms of freedom, life choices, freedom to elect and defeat governments, or the benefits of due process and presumption of innocence, it is not truly espousing a balanced policy of engagement with Russia, its government and people.

There are many ways to sustain the advantages of the liberal democratic order that do not involve military deployment: investment in Eastern European NATO allies, strategic collaboration between universities and research institutes in Canada and Eastern Europe, and more focused trade and educational missions and exchanges.

The erosion of support for the established elements of the liberal democratic order is driven by trade agreements that are successfully portrayed as inequitable and distributionally discriminatory within societies, countries and economies. International instruments of the order, such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the Security Council are portrayed as impotent, wildly elitist, or simply disconnected from the day-to-day economic struggle of young people, refugees, middle and working class taxpayers, and the poor who aspire to a better life. At some level, the Asian Infrastructure Investment bank is a Chinese engagement questioning the efficacy and effectiveness of existing investment and monetary authorities and the way in which they do not share power in a fashion that reflects present geopolitical and economic reality. But that questioning is not hostile and it is creative, to the Chinese government's credit.

This brings us back to the Marshall Plan reference I made a few minutes ago. In the beginning and in the end, the two core freedoms that are at the centre of any rational foreign policy for Canada, freedom from fear and freedom from want, are very closely tied together in both strength and trajectory.

There is a reason that the IMF has spoken recently about liquidity and its importance within an economy of opportunity. An economy of opportunity and of genuine mobility is a bulwark against despair and a foundation for hope and trust. If the liberal democratic idea is not only to survive, but thrive and advance, and remain competitive with the authoritarian model, it must be competitive. The Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank with membership that includes India, Canada, the UK, Germany, France, Spain, New Zealand, Korea, and Brazil, is a good thing but not, in any total way, an integrated, ultimate answer.

When a blue chip group of Canadian business leaders argue for a similar structure here in Canada, as they recently have, that should help us understand why new instruments with less bureaucratic delay and more acute action capacity are so important.

Where Canada can and should provide leadership is in shaping a liberal democratic consensus on income security, employment support and poverty abatement, and infrastructure investment. These are the modernizing aspects of future needs and requirements that can sustain and broaden the liberal democratic idea going forward. An idea needs to be real, helpful and sustained by modern and productive programmes, facilities, and social supports so everyone feels they have a chance and an opportunity. Retreating to nationalist and nativist excess, to protectionism, to anti-institutional bias, is simply what happens when individual prospects for the majority of people dim and diminish. In the west, we have politicians in many of our parties who are delighted to use the fear of the future to fan the flames of xenophobic despair and withdrawal for their own narrow and personal benefit. Engagement on the files of social justice, economic inclusion, investment, and growth in the countries of the west are as vital today to sustaining the liberal democratic ideal going forward as was the Marshall Plan in combating totalitarian communism after World War II, and building the roots of democracy and freedom into the DNA of post-war European society. There is genuine capacity in Canada, with huge institutional quasi-sovereign funds for investment, run by competent and able fiduciaries - like the Caisse de Depot, the Teachers' Pension Fund, the Public Service Pension Fund, the

Canada Pension Fund, the Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement Fund, and others - to partner with Canada and other countries to build, shape, expand and facilitate more robust and productive societies. A foreign policy based on freedom from fear and freedom from want would incorporate precisely this kind of collaborative Canadian global initiative within the quiver of foreign policy instruments for progress available for our future and that of the world.

A rational foreign policy that is real and effective must be integrated. Different pieces heading off in different directions, uncoordinated and unreflective of the same underlying values and purposes simply lighten an already too light global footprint for a country of our size, population, geography and history.

In 2014-15, our then-Foreign Affairs Department had a wide range of desired “strategic outcomes” listed, under which there were many different programmes. A myriad of diverse local investment programmes, Religious Freedom funds, local partnership programmes, and programmes for bilateral and regional diplomacy populate its departmental plans and priorities. These are subdivided for fragile countries, countries in crisis, global engagement, which are all listed separately from “Canadian

engagement”. Hundreds of “statements of concern” occupy our Global Affairs website.

I am reminded of a former colleague at Queen’s, soundly viewed as a scholar of great impact, a superb teacher and researcher, and an excellent advisor to doctoral students and candidates. At a recent festschrift celebrating his nominal retirement, one of his doctoral students spoke warmly of the kinds of questions he would write on page after page of doctoral manuscript: “Why is this important?”, “Why should anyone care?”, “So what?” The mind boggles at what he might write on the stated plans and arcane structures of Canada’s present foreign ministry.

For a foreign policy to be rational and integrated, its essential purposes and underlying values must be clear. An ADM for “Freedom from Fear”, which would encompass security and alliance cooperation, harm prevention, the defence of North America, global anti-terrorism initiatives, democracy and diversity promotion, refugee welcome and intake policies, judicial and police training, intelligence cooperation, genocide prevention, the responsibility to protect, and promotion of the liberal democratic ideal would make immense and foundational sense.

Another ADM on 'Freedom from Want', grouping the International Development Research Corporation, the actual delivery of foreign aid, the building of a low carbon economy, investment collaboration, trade promotion, and support for international social justice, including Indigenous rights and minority protection and equality of opportunity should be the other main division. All activities and expenditures, all programmes and initiatives, all special missions, should respond clearly and precisely to these critical strategic divisions for foreign policy development, planning, and delivery and analysis. Some effects will be long-term. Some will be short-term. But all need to be measured and assessed and should be done so in an annual report to Parliament and Canadians.

And what will emerge quickly, as a more rational and integrated policy goes forward, is that we need to have a frank discussion on resources.

Whatever our diplomatic, foreign policy, development, security or trade promotion priorities, we do not have sufficient resources now committed to do the job well and right. Without the ability to have naval task forces plus competent coastal patrol capacity on all three oceans, and the ability to deploy on, beneath and above the sea with our allies in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans, the

Mediterranean and Caribbean, at full task force strength, we are not an ally to be counted upon or an enemy of aggressors about whom anyone need care or worry. Without our own Air Craft Carrier, mixed purpose hospital ship, or amphibious capacity, our humanitarian capacity is not to be taken seriously. Aspiring, through refit and procurement, to our present thirty ships navy is unrealistic. A sixty ship navy, built over time, through strategic acquisition and procurement is what we need to pursue. Enhanced heavy lift air transport purchased during the Afghanistan engagement has made a real and substantive difference in the following equation. The ability to have influence and promote non-violent solutions and outcomes = the ability to move 5,000 troops, aid workers, field hospital, police or peace observers, or humanitarian workers anywhere in the world within days; not weeks nor months. We have the lift capacity, but we lack the larger complement of deployable trained military and other skilled public actors who can make this work.

I have said before, and repeat here again this evening, that as we cross the threshold to our one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of Confederation, it would be deeply supportive of a rational foreign policy if we committed to a combined military capacity for all our forces – naval, air, land, and Special of 150,000: 100,000

permanent forces and 50,000 Reserves. This would be built over five years, but the policy commitment should be made and the ramp up begun in 2017.

It would also be a good time to revive the Paul Martin suggestion of a Canadian Humanitarian + Democracy Corporation that would recruit people between the ages of 24 and 40 to serve abroad in support of aid goals, international development, education, democracy and humanitarian support, election supervision, and all the associated arts. In areas of insecurity, they may need a Canadian Force escort, as was the case with CIDA officials in Afghanistan. In other parts of the world that may not be necessary. But we should partner with organizations like the Agha Kahn Development Foundation (with whom Canada already has an MOU signed under the Harper administration) and with other like-minded allies as in Korea, Japan, the UK, Finland, Iceland, Jordan, Israel, India and others. My engagement with young people at various stages of their education has now spanned close to a quarter of a century. The desire to serve abroad, in defence of human rights, economic opportunity, and a better way ahead for more people has never been stronger. This generation should not be denied a genuine chance to build a better world simply because

our foreign policy is a bit muddled and overstuffed with micro-priorities that mean very little. We can, and must, do better.

It was a mistake for the previous government to botch a constructive proposal for a “Democracy Canada Institute” largely through bureaucratic obfuscation and ministerial incompetence and the victory of ‘turfism’ over solid innovation. Hundreds of Canadians work for democracy support organizations around the world: American, British, EU and others. They would all like to work for Canada and advance our particular sense of Canadian sensibility, understanding, diversity, tolerance and both national and global citizenship. The Martin initiative did not have sufficient time to get off the ground and, as often happens, a different government with its own priorities sought a different path. A proposal for a “Democracy Canada Institute” did go to Cabinet but failed there as the sponsoring Minister was unable to answer questions from other ministers driven largely by their respective departments’ desire to protect their existing turf. That’s how and why good ideas go to Ottawa to find a place to die. We can, and must, do better.

Gareth Evans, former Australian Foreign Minister, argued convincingly that the success by which Middle Powers can

conduct niche diplomacy is tied to “concentrating resources in specific areas best able to generate returns worth having, rather than trying to cover the field”. It means picking priorities in terms of concentration, collaboration, outcomes, and engagement. You can’t dance at every wedding on the same Saturday night no matter how much you love each friend who might be getting married. Let me offer a few examples of engagements that would reflect the right priorities.

In Asia, while we may need to focus on China because of Trade and Immigration working with Korea as a middle power, on joint initiatives in Asia and around the world would make genuine and real sense. As Dr. Seung Hyok Lee reported in a research paper for the Asia Pacific Foundation some years ago, Korea, in 2011, established a permanent body for Korea-China-Japan Trilateral cooperation and has helped with the East Asian and Trilateral summit. Both Tokyo and Beijing trust Seoul. Korea, like Canada, has no colonial past in Asia or Africa. Contributions to the UN Peacekeeping operations by Korea have been meaningful and Korean troops have been dispatched to serve with Canadians and Australians in Afghanistan, Haiti, Lebanon, Somalia, and the UAE. As a vibrant and firmly entrenched democracy, with growing

wealth and capacity, Korea is a superb middle power partner for Canada to embrace.

If we think about shipbuilding, one of Canada's deep policy and procurement errors of delay, cost overrun, inefficiency and perpetual snafu, a joint Canada-Korea Marine Infrastructure consortium would make immense sense. Both countries industrial conglomerates would have to be open to the notion of joint enterprise and sharing, but also to the greater productivity and market growth possible by both cultures working together on aspects of the shipbuilding mission each can do well.

Joint Korea-Canada humanitarian engagement around the world, joint naval deployments, and exercises would extend the reach and influence of both. Middle powers can have impact beyond their relative size and capacity by joining with other middle powers in common pursuit of mutual goals and global outcome targets.

As to where we focus our foreign policy instruments and the traditional geographic Desk Officer construct that often values the salience of geography over opportunity, a rational foreign policy really requires a balanced list of priorities and opportunities, where

the demands of our focus on freedom from fear and freedom from want coincide with areas where we can make a difference.

Clearly, in the Middle East, the trust that has been built up between Israel and Canada during the last government should not be dissipated by inaction in the region in areas where Canada can make a difference. Economic investment in Gaza for example, in education, training and infrastructure, to help generate jobs and opportunity for young people would make immense sense and fall within the “freedom from want” context. More extensive support for the refugee challenge in Turkey and Jordan, plus an increased intake by Canada commensurate with our size and capacity, would indicate that our initial intake of 31,000 was neither illusory nor capricious.

Canada should be clear in its support for, and involvement in, a no-fly-zone over Syria. The avoidance of which by the west, and the abdication in favour of Russian air power, has produced untold suffering, death and more refugees. Canada should offer more support for Naval and other forces in the region that are aimed at countering the Syrian-Russian-Iranian axis. Whether this is typified as strategic or humanitarian is for the historians and international law folks to sort out. But if what Russia has done has

already been classified by many as a war crime, surely putting an end to it is the opposite. Continuing to go along to get along is to send a message to Russia about the value of tactical engagements, regardless of the humanitarian carnage it generates, with impunity.

Impunity is often always the pre-cursor to atrocity. America chose not to engage on this file directly when various red lines were crossed by Assad and his Russian enablers. Failing to engage violates the UN doctrine, with Canadian roots, of the Responsibility to Protect. The short form is R2P; not, as some may prefer, R2A: the responsibility to avoid.

Russia is very different from China. Unlike Russia, our Chinese friends have been in no meaningful way aggressive outside their own region. Beyond the South China Sea dispute, the Chinese are investing around the world, not always with the environmental or labor relation nuances we might like, but not with negative or aggressive military purpose. Chinese humanitarian and peacekeeping forces have deployed with the UN in Lebanon and elsewhere. They may seek greater influence concurrent with their enhanced economic status, but there is a genuine absence of aggressive intent militarily throughout the world. That is very different from the realities and risks of the Putin doctrine.

Let me come back to why a core thematic foundation that embraces the two freedoms from both want and fear is fundamental to a rational foreign policy:

- It is not about right vs left.
- It embraces a wide range of instrumental choices.
- It can engage Canadians, young people, business, trade unions, and NGOs in a mission that is real, understandable, principled and practical.
- It builds on the principled, courageous and important parts of our foreign policy history.
- It reflects common values that Canadians share.
- It does not portray or assume that our domestic priorities or circumstance is flawless.

I end with a quote from a wonderful book written by the distinguished Canadian foreign correspondent, David Halton. The book, “Dispatches from the Front” published by McClelland and Stewart in 2015 talks about the remarkable life of Mathew Halton, David’s Father. As many here will know, Mathew Halton was the articulate, determined Toronto Star and CBC journalist whose voice and articles became the trumpet through which Canadians

understood the early Nazi excesses in the 1930s, the calumny of Chamberlain's appeasement at Munich and the horrors, victories, casualties, sufferings, atrocities and many setbacks of Canada's remarkable war effort between 1939 and 1945. Mathew Halton went to the front, landed at Normandy, was there for the liberation of Holland, saw the horrors of the concentration camps and the torn bodies and minds of the wounded and maimed of all sides. He died on December 3, 1956, a few days after filing a report on the crisis in Suez. The cause was natural, a stroke, but it followed illnesses that spoke to what the hard-living of the war had done to his body as he relentlessly pursued a story he was determined Canadians had the right to hear.

At the end of the African campaign and the success of the British Eighth army and allies over Rommel's Africa Corps, Matthew Halton had written a wildly popular account of the battle entitled "Ten Years to Alamein". It was a best seller and received rave reviews around the world. After going through the many setbacks, the suffering, the intensity of battle, the casualties and manoeuvres on both sides, he summed up with a view of what he had learned through all that he had seen to date. He ended that book with five words.

After his death, a new high school in his home town of Pincher Creek was inaugurated in his name. David Halton's text records what happened as follows, on page 256: "Of all the honours Matt received, none would have pleased him more than the one bestowed on the day after his funeral. On December 7, the Pincher Creek school Board voted to have its new school named after him. A year later the Matthew Halton High school was formally opened. Ultra-modern for the time, its twenty-one classrooms, library and auditorium reflected a prospering community far different from the pioneer village where he was born. Words from the concluding paragraph of "Ten Years to Alamein" are inscribed on a bronze plaque over the school's main entrance: "Idealism is the only realism".

The notion that the two are disconnected, especially in foreign policy, is a notion that leads to the victory of cynicism over principle, avoidance over engagement, impunity over accountability; drift over purpose.

The Canadian ideal, however self-effacing and apologetic we may be on occasion, deserves better. The men and women with the Canada Flash on their shoulder, in the air, on and under the sea, in our land and Special and Intelligence forces, who have served and

sacrificed, and still do, deserve better. The veterans among us, who saw and confronted the worst of events and inhumanities around the world so that we might live in freedom, deserve better. The outstanding women and men of our Foreign Service deserve better. The young Canadians who believe in the Canadian idea, and want to make it real at home and around the world, deserve better.

And above all, this Almost Middle Power we share and love, deserves nothing less.